Friday, May 22, 2009

Numbness Outside Of Knee

The strange war chest

Within a decade China has built a fabulous exchange reserves mainly in dollars. The official figure reached 1.9 trillion dollars and some of the estimated more than 2300 billion dollars.'s GDP of china, it comes only reach 3.5 trillion dollars. These reserves in recent months of financial turmoil aroused great passions and especially very large fantasies.

The problem is often stated as follows: during the last decade, trade relations between the U.S. and China were unbalanced. China has enjoyed a strong trade surplus that enabled him to build huge foreign reserves that it has converted mainly U.S. Treasury bills. But with the economic crisis and financial deficits have exploded U.S. State (the U.S. deficit will reach 12.9% of GDP in 2009) and the Fed has blithely run printing money (base money doubled in the United States within 6 months). China feels trapped address these growing risks of default and inflation. High inflation in the U.S. would collapse the price of dollars and therefore result in a loss of capital importance for the Chinese central bank. Chinese stir, and call on U.S. to pursue a fiscal policy and monetary wise. The Chinese treasure may evaporate. tensions grow between China accused the U.S. of Chinese exports have paid with funny money and the U.S. accusing China of deliberately manipulating the exchange rate to maintain strong trade surpluses. The delicate balance between Chinese who are benefiting from their trade surplus to maintain strong growth and the U.S. who are financing their monstrous budget deficit by the Chinese government could collapse with all the consequences that implies.

The reasoning I have just described is virtually meaningless. Yet it is repeated with the utmost seriousness by a large number of commentators decked out in their caps "expert". As often, the most basic principles are evaded. To try to understand the situation in China meet its reserve we will reflect on some points.

First, China's reserves have so far been the big winners in this economic crisis. Interest rates on U.S. Treasury bonds have collapsed. This implies that the price of long-term bonds held by the Chinese central bank has exploded. Meanwhile, the dollar was widely reassessed against the euro. The consequence is obvious: the value of China's reserves is more important than it was a year ago.

But there not even the issue. In reality, the Chinese central bank to make capital gains or capital losses, it has almost no importance.

How are China's reserves?

When currency area enjoys trade surpluses against another currency zone, the currency of this material should be revalued (its value should increase). When a U.S. company important to China, it pays in dollars. These dollars are then changed by the Chinese company in yuan. When Chinese purchases in the U.S., it will change its yuan to dollars. Thus, if China exports more to the United States it imports, the demand for yuan against dollar will be stronger than the demand for dollars against Yuan. Thus, as the basic principle of supply and demand, the value of the yuan against the dollar should rise. But if the yuan is reassessed, Chinese products may be less attractive for American companies. Likewise, American goods are more attractive to Chinese consumers. Thus, it would deal a blow to China's growth. To maintain the competitiveness of Chinese products, the central bank intervenes in markets exchange to achieve the desired exchange rate. To do this, it simply creates it sells the Yuan against the dollar. This will balance the effect of trade surpluses and the course of the Yuan remains stable. These dollars are then reinvested in Treasury bills for the simple reason that it is impossible to find 2000 billion dollars in base currency. Base money was only 800 billion U.S. a few months ago. Treasury bills are both the closest substitute of money and financial assets are widely available since the Bush presidency.

China has accumulated this treasure of war not for future needs but to stimulate and sustain economic growth at two points in his country. Fears about a "capital loss" of China's central bank are absolutely irrelevant. Again, many commentators confuse bank and central bank. Both types of institution have nothing to do.

What could make the Chinese government with these reserves? He can not spend it on the market because it would mean a conversion of dollars into yuan, which would mechanically raising the price of the yuan. That is exactly the effect that the government China tries to avoid. The Chinese government does not use large-scale reserves for placing orders abroad because this would penalize its own industry. The Chinese government can not begin to buy large shares of foreign private companies. Indeed, if this was done on a large scale, the tensions would be too great with the countries where companies are based. What sovereign state would support the nationalization of its business by a foreign government?! Such a strategy would only provoke protectionist reactions weakening the Chinese export industry. 2 000 billion unusable!

Do not forget that the Chinese government's goal is the industrial and economic growth and not the accumulation of foreign reserves. Thus, if foreign reserves are losing their value, it would not change anything .... China is by no trapping dollars as the value of its foreign exchange reserves does not affect its real wealth.

It is really strange that so much confusion may be done about it. Mercantilist episodes in Europe of the sixteenth and seventeenth century are yet well known. This economic ideology was to accumulate gold reserves of the most important potential by exporting as much as possible and the least important. The gold used in power to buy weapons to defeat his opponents and survive. It was in the service of economic policy. It was then, thanks to Ricardo and its precursors, including the direction of the exchange was to increase production at each of the commercial players to improve the material well-being of populations.

It is really amazing to see so many commentators moved possible "loss of capital" of China's central bank. Some also fear for the capital of EDF buys more and more debt to support its private bank loans. A central bank is not a bank. The confusion comes from the form in which central banks' balance sheets for companies like classical value of the asset is equal to the liabilities. Reserves in gold and foreign exchange, loans made to banks are capitalized. The currency in circulation is the liability. If the asset is devalued, what about liability? Money Does any value because it is supported by the value of the assets of the bank Central? The answer is no. The great economist Silvio Gesell already ridiculed in the 1910s the style of German banknotes "This ticket entitles you to 100 marks from the Central Bank", explaining that it is identical to write "who will share his ticket to the central bank will receive 100 strokes of the cane. " The currency has no value because it has an equivalent to the central bank, it has value because there is a demand for money, that money is scarce and it is recognized by the state and used to pay the tax. The central bank balance sheet structure as rest of our monetary system is a relic of the old gold standard. We experience reality in a system that has not been redesigned in the fall of Bretton Woods. Keynes took up the concept of money demand Gesell'm taught in all classes of the world economy, the ridiculousness of the situation does not jump in the eyes of many.

A question persists. Why Chinese rulers they are moved to the political risk of significant inflation in the U.S. (according to risk me greatly overstated)? The reason is simple, if markets expect high inflation, the dollar could collapse. Automatically, the yuan will be stronger against the dollar than it was and Chinese exports may suffer greatly.

What China fears reality is that in the United States begin to practice the same strategy as his own, that is to say, is to knowingly to devalue its currency to boost its exports. What the world should fear is a mad race to the devaluation. Currently only China and some Asian countries including Japan's large-scale practice. These devaluations allow China to take greater advantage of international trade as their neighbor. This is the famous strategy "remains your neighbor." As China is the only practice it, it only causes of the financial imbalances. However, if everyone practices this strategy, the effects can be catastrophic. One of the great lessons of the 30s. The competitive devaluation that took place in the 30's was the final result of uncontrolled rising protectionism and a total disruption of world trade.

If the strategy of China was tolerable during expansion, it becomes difficult in times of crisis. If in the coming years China continues to maintain strong trade surpluses, while manipulating its currency, while unemployment remains very high in Western countries, tensions will worsen. These reserves, if it is unnecessary to have great chance to become the anchor of our economic frustrations.

Sunday, May 17, 2009

Ingrown Lip Hair Or Herpes?

Chinese Ending derivatives

Imagine if McDonald's was the largest shareholder WEIGHT WATCHER or SlimFast. Imagine if our rehab centers were held by major drug traffickers. The boundless cynicism of those men you would then appear as an absolute scandal. Basically, the banks act in a similar manner with impunity and without awakening the slightest hint of scandal.

The term "derivative" includes a large number of investment more or less complex and exist in the money markets, bond, action or raw materials. If the title of this article is obviously excessive, I will try to demonstrate just how many of them destabilize economies and their share of responsibility in the financial crisis we are experiencing.


begin with currency derivatives. They are to be able to exchange 1 week, 1 month, 6 months in advance a certain amount of one currency against another currency at an exchange rate fixed in advance. I can today and I agree with a bank to exchange euros cons XX YY dollars at a rate close to that today with a bank. Their role is to introduce a few certainties in the midst of enormous fluctuations in the exchange market. Indeed, how can companies manage any of his predictions, knowing that exchange rates can vary from 5, 10 or 20% within a few months. For a company that exports, the turnover which range from 5, 10 or 20% with the variation in rates. But the costs, however, are fixed in the national currency. Imagine a plane that Airbus sells for $ 10 million on 1 January. Payment is due on 1 June On 1 January the exchange rate is 1 € = 1.40 $. Airbus estimates that during these six months, the exchange rate may vary between 1 € = $ 1.20 and 1 € = 1.60 $. Thus, Airbus may receive 8.3 million euro in the most positive cases but receive 6.25 million cases in the most negative. If the cost is 6.5 million euro. Airbus can make a profit of 1.8 million euro, but could make a loss of 250 000 euros. This shows how much the currency risk can be critical for a company. To manage this risk, Airbus can subscribe to a derivative that will offer him a monetary bank. Airbus is January 1st to sign a contract under which Airbus will exchange 10 June to 1 million at a rate of 1 € = 1.43 $. Thus, on 1 June, Airbus is sure to receive 7 million euro and make a profit of 500,000 euros.

What wonderful service! The bank through its financial services has preserved our Champion European Aeronautics the terrible exchange rate risks plaguing our beautiful planet. The bank does itself no risk and actually performs arbitration on the interest rate differentials on different financial markets and its service charges by adjusting the exchange rate offered. The bank charges in the end virtually unlimited access to credit in the short-term which does not have businesses. What's wrong with that? The bank has it not done a great service to Airbus?

reasoning thus it completely sidesteps the basic issue: Who is responsible for large variations incurred on the exchange rate? In economic terms, rates exchange have absolutely no reason to change so violently in such a short time. Under the regime of floating exchange rates, changes in theory are supposed to allow trade in goods and capital between currency areas to achieve a balance. There is no deficit or surplus on both sides. The dollar, the yen may vary against the euro from 20 to 30% in 1 year. The terms of trade between different currency areas are very far also vary greatly. This is speculation on exchange rates is the main cause of the violence of these variations. Each day 60 billion worth of goods traded between the different currency areas. 6,000 billion is traded on exchange markets. Find the error. Banks play a dual responsibility. First, because they are speculating heavily on their own account. Second, because they open up credit lines phenomenal speculation on currency markets to other banks or business or to hedge funds. Without this credit, speculation of this magnitude is impossible.

You understood. The banks could spread the virus and then sell the cure of the disease. The bank wins on all fronts : They take significant commissions on transactions and currency conversions on derivatives and also affect the important interests on loans and speculation. More speculation, the larger the bank wins. the financial system has thrived for years on the disorder. But the vice goes even further. Derivatives exchange rates are overwhelmingly purchased for speculative purposes and not to prevent any risk. They allow an alternative method to bet on movements in exchange rates and thus aggravate the exchange rate variations where it is supposed to be a loophole. Turning now to

derivatives on the commodity market. The problem is exactly the same as before. The price of oil, wheat, aluminum can vary violently few months. Again, changes in consumption and production of its raw materials can not explain such violence. The oil price has been multiplied by 7 in 7 years. Suppose that on 1 January, the price of oil is $ 60 per barrel. Air France fears that a significant increase in the price of oil starts to hurt margins. An investment bank offered him to buy in 6 months, oil he will then priced at $ 65. To do this, the merchant bank will borrow money to purchase the required quantity of oil at $ 60, will store these barrels. By selling six months later at $ 65, the merchant bank will repay the loan, pay the financial costs and reap a profit. Again, the bank benefits from access to credit that the company did not.

responsibility of banks is yet again double in large changes in commodity prices. First, they speculate on their own account. Second, it opens monstrous lines credit to any kind of speculator banks, hedge funds ... What's worse is that the very nature of derivatives may cause serious shortages. As we say, when a player buys a derivative, an equivalent amount is stored by the financial institution. Thus, the more people fear (or hope) a higher price, the more they will award contracts for future purchase of raw material at a fixed price. As a result, ever larger quantities are stored. The shortage is greatest. Prices rise even more. This explains how one could see wheat prices, oil soar to such heights. On the contrary when the trend reversed and the majority of players expect a significant decrease, it becomes far less interesting to subscribe to such a contract. Naturally, there are fewer that are signed. The stock set up to honor its contracts no longer serve anything and pours violently on the market. Prices collapsed completely. This partly explains how prices could collapse so fast. But we can also continue to make small calculations to predict future changes in commodity prices.


CDS (Credit Default Swap) took the spotlight by sinking the U.S. insurer AIG literally. Their concept is apparently simple. This is insurance that can be subscribed in case of default of a company that we have a claim. Thus, the insurer reimburses the insured for the amount not payƩeen case of default by the debtor. In return the insured to pay interest to the insurer on a monthly or yearly. The very existence of this product is a scandal because it challenges the very principle of credit and irresponsible makes all the players. To have a responsible, the lend money or that of its depositors must be the bearer of risk. Otherwise, all deviations are allowed.

Vice is twofold: the lender expects to achieve an arbitration. If he takes 100 euros to 6% but pays only 2% per year to the insurer, it feels like to touch 4% per year without taking any risk. The lender is completely cleared and to assess the quality of its investments since in case of payment of the claim as in case of nonpayment, the investor wins. The side of the insurer, it can provide a very large number of claims and receive a rent without investing a penny in these transactions which makes this activity extremely profitable.

is exactly what happened in the case of AIG. The group's financial division has launched headlong into the CDS insurance for hundreds or thousands of billions of debt and especially CDOs (collateral debt obligations), the product of mortgage backed securities. These CDOs were mostly rated AAA by major rating agencies or claims considered virtually certain. AIG outsourcing in all its risk assessment in these rating agencies are provided for these ridiculous financial products. Banks and hedge funds are able to jump at the chance to buy these debts can be insured in case of default and depreciation with AIG. Since defects in real estate receivables soared, AIG must repay money monstrous other financial players. This sector is completely deregulated, AIG would not put any money aside, as is the case in conventional insurance, to cover any risk. This is how the world's largest insurer became an endless hole for the U.S. government. The bailout allows the U.S. government not to allowed to spread beyond measure the effects of losses on these financial products today focus largely on the actor.

CDS also have other major problems. The sums insured are estimated at 50 000 and 60 000 billion more than the world GDP. This market is far from coming down to protect against default risk has become a giant casino where you bet on the failure of any particular company. In that market completely deregulated, we can insure against default of a company without ever having paid for the same company. Everyone can also improvise insurer without having to put any money aside. The insurer and the insured may well sell their contracts without consideration being aware. The opacity of the system is extreme. The staggering sums involved. Risks increasingly maddening.

Regulating this market is obvious if we want to avoid further explosions at AIG. But is it enough? We must return to the basis of banking to answer this question. The banker lends. For this loan, he received what he considers the cost of money added what it considers to be the risk premium of the loan. This risk premium compensates the bank where the bank is not actually paid. Assess the risk premium at a time when it will invest money from its depositors is the same job as a banker. Where is the role of CDS in this? How can someone who is not investing money can assess this risk? How the financial system may be responsible just as he clears himself of his task in favor of acting shamelessly.

The CDS issue is symbolic of the drift of the financial sector in recent decades. The perception of the banking business has grown from one to evaluate the risk that eliminate the risk. To eliminate the risk, it must pass to someone as soon as possible in any way whatsoever. How not to see that this spiral can only undermine the whole system. You have created so many beautiful counterpart as you like, the risk will always be held by someone. However, the greater the return, the greater the distance between the one who first took the risk and evaluated and the one who actually holds the risk is more important and this first one is less responsible than the second. Plus he is disempowered, most important risks are undertaken. The overall risk is growing as well as everyone feels protected. The original sin of our financial system was to believe he could ignore the essence of its function.


The same reasoning holds also for the CDO, the famous mortgage backed securities. By bringing together in one product, a large number of real estate debt, investors believed they could protect themselves from risks. Again the main problem is the astronomical distance between the one who takes the first risk and the one who actually holds. Whoever makes the loan in hand is the only one who can properly assess the risk of the mortgage. However, as the financial institution knows that she will be able to resell these claims quickly and they are then passed between many hands, his role is not to assess risk but produce a number needed to meet loan demand for this type of financial product deemed safe. Disempowerment is total.

How to defend this type of system. The lender must hold the risk. If he wants to reduce the risk of the loan, the only way is to assess its value in the risk premium on the loan based on default risks.

can be summed up the situation. There are two types of derivatives. Those where the financial sector creates disorder and then propose a panacea and where the financial sector plays in creating ever greater risks and to pass the bomb to an actor even more stupid than you hoping it explodes in his hands. The results are catastrophic. The banking profession must focus on fundamentals again if he wants to one day become responsible.




Sunday, May 3, 2009

Church Anniversary Cover Template

Why should revolutionize banking

The economic emergency in recent months has brought this issue on many lips: "Should we nationalize the banks? . If liquidity problems can be managed by a single central bank intervention in expanding their lines of credit, credit problems, they can not be solved by an injection of capital. Now that will invest money in a business that failed miserably? Nobody, apart from the state. Number of state have invested in their banks and took a role or not in their direction. A sort of hybrid model linking governments formerly reckless newly statist discourse and irresponsible management is taking the reins of global finance. The public sector is still far from being qualified to lead large banks. The pathetic failure of Credit Lyonnais and the investment policy strongly inspired by the orders of the state of Japanese banks in the 80's are there to remind us.

In this strange situation will emerge in the coming years the financial world of tomorrow. Reflection in these troubled times out our future banking model.

We know that. The allocation of financial resources plays a role in the economy of a country. They go according to productive or unproductive sectors, the health of an economy depends on it. We saw during the last thirty years a tremendous concentration of banking in most major industrialized countries (More in Europe, especially France and the United States). There is no denying that the crisis has exacerbated this situation and only a few major players are present. So a huge part of the economic salvation of our country is held a few hands. Who are these people? Do they have the skills to carry out the investment policy which our economy depends? We do know little or not. The opacity with total reign over those who have much of our economic salvation in their hands

The justification for a private banking sector joined the free market in general. Those who make the right investments to survive, others disappear. Thus the area is becoming more efficient and better and better allocate resources. What about that today? The mere failure of investment bank Lehman Brothers has completely paralyzed the entire interbank lending market and almost lead to a financial disaster without massive intervention by the state. One can say without much hesitation in coming decades, few governments take the risk of letting one of their big banks fail. This is the famous "too big to fail" aggravated by recent mergers and acquisitions bank.

The situation is well understood: the pooling of losses and privatizing gains. The situation is in itself morally and economically unsustainable. Banks whose managements have proved their failure will survive and only the direction, in the best case, be replaced. Many of them have invested heavily and knowingly in unproductive nature of speculative bubbles in search of quick profits. Many of them yet retain a similar structure to emerge from this crisis.

The banking sector in this form can not be no justification. They do not represent the public interest but the interest of shareholders and their management. Yet a bad investment policy is not sanctioned by the disappearance but by massive aid from the state allowing the bank to survive.

The model is rotting from the inside. A healthy economy can emerge from such a system. Go back to the very principles of capitalism. Healthy banks need to survive, insolvent banks, to disappear. This is possible only if the bankruptcy or a few banks can not by themselves undermine the economic system as a whole. This is possible only if banks have a limited size. This can be calculated for example in relation to the size of the liabilities of each bank. This may seem unrealistic given the current situation: the banking sector has never been concentrated. What have we gained from this merger? The enormous size of the banks would allow optimal diversification of investments and thus reduce the risk of bankruptcy. Many banks have instead taken risks to the extent of their gigantism. The enormous size of banks is intended to allow to fund huge investments to large enterprises. With the financial disintermediation, huge investments can be financed without the help of a great institution.

Nothing, absolutely nothing justifies such a concentration of banking. The spray will not be easy. But it is a necessary task.

In the model Allais / Fisher wilderness we stand here, banks of deposit and loan banks would be separated. Since banks deposit would keep all money deposited in the bank, the risk of failure would be extremely limited. So all of these deposits could be guaranteed by the state. Bank lending and investment they have a size limit determined by size of liabilities. Applicants would be informed of possible returns and risks and deposit their money knowingly. In case of bankruptcy due to a solvency problem, the bank simply disappear. Depositors would be compensated to the tune of amounts recoverable and businesses dependent on bank financing of this sustained for some time.